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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j), the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the district court's order of summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the replacement of old 
storage tanks with new storage tanks violated the City's nonconforming use ordinance, 
where the replacement was mandated by State law, occurred within the one-year time 
period contemplated by the City's Ordinance, did not constitute an enlargement of the 
existing legal nonconforming use under the Ordinance, and had no adverse impact on 
neighboring properties. 
Standard of Review: This case was decided in the district court on cross-motions 
for summary judgment and involves the application of undisputed facts to applicable 
State and local law. The standard of review on appeal is therefore correction of error, 
with this Court according no deference to the trial court. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 
P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996). 
Record Citation: This issue was the subject of the briefing on the cross-motions for 
summary judgment. R. App. at 37-217; see id. at 88-98. 
2. In the alternative, whether the district court erred in holding that use of the 
new storage tanks does not constitute a valid accessory use under the City's Ordinance. 
Standard of Review: This issue was decided on summary judgment. The standard 
of review on appeal is therefore correction of error, with this Court according no 
1 
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deference to the trial court. Nelson, 919 P.2d at 571. 
Record Citation: This issue was raised and preserved in the briefing on summary 
judgment. R. App. at 214-17. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
This case is governed by the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-103(l)(/c) to 
(/) and 10-9-408(1) to (2)(b), and Woods Cross City Ordinance §§ 12-22-101 to - 106, 
which are set forth in full in the Addendum. (Also contained in the Addendum is a copy 
of the District Court's Memorandum Decision.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Golden Eagle Oil Refinery, Inc. ("Golden Eagle") operates a 
facility in Woods Cross City for recycling used petroleum products. Due to a zoning 
change in 1991, Golden Eagle's operations are now classified as a legal nonconforming 
use under City law. When the current owners purchased the Property and facility in 
1993, they began an extensive and very costly effort to clean up the hazardous waste and 
eliminate the dangerous conditions left by the previous owner. They were applauded and 
encouraged in these efforts by Defendant-Appellee Woods Cross City ("City") and the 
Utah Department of Environmental Quality. 
Tanks for storing used petroleum products are an integral part of Golden Eagle's 
nonconforming use, since oil recycling cannot occur without storage tanks. Seventeen of 
Golden Eagle's storage tanks did not comply with new State environmental regulations. 
2 
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Accordingly, State regulators at the Department of Environmental Quality ordered that 
Golden Eagle remove the 17 illegal storage tanks, dispose of the petroleum product 
therein, and replace them with newer tanks that complied with State law. However, as 
Golden Eagle was installing six Certified Tanks to replace the 17 Old Storage Tanks, the 
City intervened and ordered that Golden Eagle remove the new tanks. The City claimed 
that installation of the new Certified Tanks would violate the City's nonconfonning use 
ordinance. 
In response, Golden Eagle brought this action in the district court seeking a 
declaration of its rights. Among other things, Golden Eagle argued that it had a right to 
install the Certified Tanks so as to comply with State law and the dictates of State 
regulators, and that the City could not thwart such compliance with arbitrary restrictions. 
It also maintained that since they would actually lessen adverse impacts, the six Certified 
Tanks would not be an enlargement of Golden Eagle's existing nonconfonning use under 
the City's ordinance. In the alternative, Golden Eagle argued that the Certified Tanks 
should be allowed as an accessory use. However, the district court rejected Golden 
Eagle's claims and affirmed the City's order compelling removal of the new tanks. 
Golden Eagle now appeals. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below. 
On June 10, 1999, Woods Cross City informed Golden Eagle that it needed to 
obtain site plan approval from the City with respect to the replacement of 17 old storage 
tanks with six newer tanks. See Record on Appeal ("R. App.") at 86. On August 10, 
3 
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1999, the Woods Cross City Planning Commission unanimously agreed that Golden 
Eagle should be allowed to install the six tanks. Id. at 87. On October 6, 1999, the City 
Council rejected the Planning Commission's recommendation. Id. In a letter dated 
October 7, 1999, the City ordered Golden Eagle to remove the tanks from its property 
within 14 days. Id. at 87-88. After the City rejected a timely appeal of the City Council's 
decision, on December 16, 1999, Golden Eagle filed this action in the Second Judicial 
District Court in Davis County (Judge Jon M. Memmott) requesting a declaration that 
Golden Eagle was entitled to utilize the tanks as part of its valid nonconforming use. Id. 
at 1. Golden Eagle filed an amended complaint on January 13, 2000. Id. at 11. On 
February 3, 2000, Woods Cross City filed an Answer and Counterclaim requesting an 
injunction requiring Golden Eagle to remove the tanks from its property. Id. at 22. 
On April 27, 2000, Golden Eagle filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all 
claims asserted in the Amended Complaint. Id. at 74. On June 13, 2000, the City filed a 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaims. Id. at 131. On August 29, 
2000, oral argument was held before Judge Memmott on the motions for summary 
judgment. See Addendum ("Add.") at 7-8. With pemiission of the court, Golden Eagle 
submitted a Supplemental Memorandum on September 9, 2000, and Woods Cross City 
submitted a responsive Supplemental Memorandum on September 14, 2000. R.App. at 
208, 219. In a Memorandum Decision dated October 17, 2000, the district court denied 
Golden Eagle's Motion for Summary Judgment, granted the City's Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dismissed Golden Eagle's claims with prejudice, and enjoined 
4 
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Golden Eagle from using the six tanks upon its property. Add. at 21. A final Order, 
incorporating the holdings of the Memorandum Decision, was issued by the Court on 
December 1, 2000. R.App. at 248. This timely appeal followed. 
In the Memorandum Decision, the district court ruled that (1) Golden Eagle had 
permanently discontinued the use of its old storage tanks; (2) the installment of the six 
new tanks constituted a prohibited enlargement of a nonconforming use; and (3) the 
proposed use of the six new tanks did not constitute an accessory use. Add. at 5-21. 
III. Statement of Facts. 
Golden Eagle Acquires the Subject Property and Begins Cleanup Efforts. For 
many years, Plaintiff-Appellant Golden Eagle Oil Refinery, Inc. ("Golden Eagle") has 
operated a used-oil reclamation and disposal facility on property ("Property") located 
within an industrial zone in Woods Cross City, Utah. See R. App. at 78. In 1991, 
Defendant-Appellee Woods Cross City ("City") changed the zoning on the Property from 
a heavy industrial classification, which permitted oil reclamation activities, to a light 
industrial classification which does not. Id. Golden Eagle's used-oil reclamation facility 
has continued to operate on the Property as a legal nonconforming use. Id. Since 1993, 
Golden Eagle has continuously possessed a valid business permit from the City allowing 
it to continue operating its oil reclamation facility. Id. at 79-80. 
In 1993, Stan Hartmark and Merrill Maughan purchased Golden Eagle and all its 
assets in order to clean up the Property and continue the company's used-oil reclamation 
activities. Id. at 79. The previous owners had made a substantial mess of the Property, 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
leaving behind what could fairly have been described as a dangerous hazardous waste 
zone. See id. at 102-03, 148. In anticipation of a long stay, Golden Eagle began an 
expensive and large-scale effort to clean up and beautify the Property - an effort which 
for years has been encouraged, commended, and overseen by City and State officials. Id. 
at 79, 81,83. 
Ultimately, Golden Eagle spent approximately $1,000,000 to clean up the 
Property, which included (1) removing and properly disposing of 800 55-gallon drums 
containing hazardous waste, (2) removing and disposing of tons of soil contaminated by 
hazardous materials, (3) arranging for the removal and disposal of six cases of highly 
explosive pitric acid found stored on the Property, and (4) painting and/or installing 
asphalt, concrete, fencing, lights, flag poles, and landscaping. Id. at 83, 148. 
Golden Eagle's Operations Necessarily Entail the Storage of Used Petroleum 
Products in Storage Tanks. Golden Eagle's reclamation business involves the removal 
of dirt, particles, water, and other contaminants from used petroleum products. To the 
extent this process is successful, the result is useful petroleum products which Golden 
Eagle can then market. Id. at 78. Because the supply of used petroleum products does 
not always match an oil reclamation facility's processing capacity, such facilities use 
large tanks to store used petroleum products until such time as they can be processed or 
properly discarded; as such, storage tanks are part and parcel of Golden Eagle's 
reclamation operations. Id. Petroleum products which are too contaminated to be 
recycled must be stored and eventually disposed of through other means. Golden Eagle 
6 
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provides a valuable service to those in the community who need to properly dispose of 
used petroleum products, regardless of whether such products can successfully be 
recycled.1 
Accordingly, prior to the zoning change in 1991, and at all times since, there have 
been numerous storage tanks on the Property. R. App. at 79. Among those which 
predated the zoning change were the 17 storage tanks ("Old Storage Tanks") that are the 
subject of this litigation. Prior to 1991, and until their replacement in 1998-99, the Old 
Storage Tanks were continuously used to store used petroleum products. Id. at 79, 84, 
103. 
Oversight and Regulation of Golden Eagle's Operations and Cleanup Efforts 
By The Utah Department of Environmental Quality's Division of Solid and 
Hazardous Waste. Golden Eagle's cleanup efforts were conducted under the close 
scrutiny of State and City officials. On October 25, 1993, the City's Administrator, Gary 
Uresk, wrote a letter to the Utah State Department of Environmental Quality's Division of 
Solid and Hazardous Waste (the "Division") regarding Golden Eagle's request to the 
Division for an oil reclamation permit. Apparently concerned that Golden Eagle's 
storage tanks be properly safeguarded against dangerous leaks, Mr. Uresk requested that 
Golden Eagle's pemiit be postponed until formal mles were adopted governing secondary 
*As a form of hazardous waste, one cannot simply dump used petroleum products 
into the sewer system or the local landfill. To avoid soil and water contamination, State 
law requires that petroleum products be disposed of according to specific guidelines. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-706. 
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containment systems (i.e., basins and berms used to contain any used oil leaking from 
storage tanks) for oil recyclers such as Golden Eagle. Id. at 80. 
On December 22, 1993, the Division issued a permit for Golden Eagle to operate 
as a used oil reclaimer and used oil transporter. Id. However, the permit was expressly 
conditioned upon Golden Eagle's future compliance with the statutes and mles regulating 
the reclamation and transportation of used oil. Id.; see Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
705(1 )(c)(iii.). As such, Golden Eagle's operations and its efforts to clean up the 
extensive mess left by the previous owners were regularly monitored by the Division, as 
well as encouraged by the City. R. App. at 80-81. 
A principal issue in bringing Golden Eagle's operations into compliance with new 
State environmental regulations was ensuring proper containment of leaks from storage 
tanks. As Mr. Uresk's letter indicates, that issue was of significant concern to the City. 
Id. at 80. Utah Admin. Code R315-15-5.5(c) states that storage containers used by used-
oil processors and re-refiners "shall be equipped with a secondary containment system . . . 
[which] shall consist of. . . dikes, berms or retaining walls" and a floor which is 
impervious to used oil. Utah Admin. Code. R315-15-5.5(c). 
After inspecting Golden Eagle's facility, on December 12, 1995, David Wheeler, 
an agent in the Division, drafted a "Used Oil Inspection Report" where he noted that 
certain tanks ulack[ed] adequate secondary containment," which constituted a "violation 
of [Utah Administrative Code] R315-15-5.5(c)." R. App. at 81. On January 25, 1996, 
Dennis R. Downs, Director of the Division, sent a letter warning Golden Eagle to comply 
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with applicable State regulations, and specifically noting that certain tanks "lacked 
adequate secondary containment... in noncompliance with R315-15-5.5(c) UAC." Id. 
Mr. Downs reiterated that the continuation of Golden Eagle's operations was contingent 
on Golden Eagle (1) placing the tanks in question "into a proper secondaiy containment, 
consisting of concrete berms on ALL four sides and a concrete floor"; (2) applying for 
and receiving a modification to its used oil processor permit which would detail the 
number, types, sizes and location of all their used oil tanks; and (3) ensuring that "[a]ll 
other tanks not within concrete secondary containment will be drained and kept empty 
until the preceding two conditions have been met." Id. 
Under the supervision of the Division, over the next four years Messrs. Hartmark 
and Maughan continued the costly process of cleaning up the Property, progressively 
bringing Golden Eagle's operations into compliance with State environmental 
regulations. See id. at 82. Throughout this process, the Division's repeated concern was 
that leaking storage tanks be fixed or replaced and that proper secondary containment 
structures be put into place. Id. Indeed, replacement of old tanks was a key element of 
the cleanup. In a report issued on March 9, 1999, Mr. Wheeler stated that part of the 
cleanup "plan is to replace [certain] older tanks with new tanks." The report summary 
stated that "[n]ew improvements include further tank and secondary containment 
upgrades" and that "[fjuture improvements include . . . getting tanks ASTM[2] certified, 
2ASTM refers to The American Society for Testing and Materials. 
9 
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getting new tanks, and [providing] more parking area paving." Id, 
Removal and Replacement of the Old Storage Tanks. In 1998, Mr. Wheeler 
noted that the Old Storage Tanks - which even prior to the 1991 zoning change had been 
used continuously to store used petroleum products as part of Golden Eagle's operations 
- were leaking used petroleum. Id. at 84, 103. In response to this hazardous situation, 
Mr. Wheeler informed Golden Eagle that it must comply with applicable State 
environmental regulations by removing and disposing of the 17 Old Storage Tanks and 
replacing them with tanks that complied with new environmental regulations. Id. 
It is undisputed that there was no feasible method of modernizing the Old Storage 
Tanks to bring them into compliance with the State's new environmental regulations; 
although adequate for Golden Eagle's reclamation purposes, they simply could not be 
made to comply with the new State requirements. Id. The only way to achieve 
compliance with the new regulations was to remove the Old Storage Tanks, pour concrete 
containment basins, and then install more modem tanks. Id. 
To comply with the Division's demand, in May of 1998 Golden Eagle began the 
process of emptying the used oil from the 17 Old Storage Tanks, properly disposing of it, 
and replacing the tanks with 6 newer, safer, "API" certified tanks ("Certified Tanks") that 
would meet State standards. Id, This was a monumental and expensive process. Id, The 
Old Storage Tanks ranged in capacity from 5,000 gallons to 20,000 gallons and 
collectively held a total of 18,660 gallons of used petroleum products, an average of 
1,090 gallons per tank, with no tank holding less than 500 gallons of petroleum product. 
10 
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Id. at 84-85. The cost for Golden Eagle to dispose of the used oil was $2,007.00. Id. at 
85. Once the Old Storage Tanks were drained. Golden Eagle incurred another $26,247 in 
costs to remove them from the Property. Id. 
Golden Eagle then installed the 6 newer Certified Tanks. Id. at 184. Two of these 
were installed on or about March 31, 1999. Id. at 184, 167, 175.3 The four remaining 
tanks were installed on or about April 22, 1999. Id. at 184. Hence, all six of the Certified 
Tanks were installed less than one year after Golden Eagle removed and disposed of the 
contents of the Old Storage Tanks. Id. 
Each of the six Certified Tanks has a capacity of about 19,300 gallons. Id. at 85. 
Thus, while each of the Certified Tanks was smaller than some of the Old Storage Tanks 
and larger than others, not one of the Certified Tanks was as large as the largest of the 
Old Storage Tanks. Though not brand new, the Certified Tanks were certified by the 
American Petroleum Institute. Id. Golden Eagle also installed cement containment 
basins for each Certified Tank as required by State environmental regulations. Id. The 
cost for Golden Eagle to purchase the Certified Tanks, construct the cement containment 
basins, and install the Certified Tanks within those basins was $27,690.00. Id. at 85. To 
make the Property more aesthetically pleasing its neighbors, Golden Eagle shifted the 
location of the tanks away from the edge of the Property to the center. Id. at 86. 
3The date provided in Golden Eagle's briefing below is March 31, 2000. However, 
this was a typographical error. The exhibit upon which the affidavit relied expressly 
indicates the date as March 31, 1999. See id. at 175. 
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In all, Golden Eagle removed the 17 Old Storage Tanks with a combined capacity 
of 202,000 gallons and replaced them in less than a year with the 6 Certified Tanks with a 
combined capacity of 116,000 - a reduction in storage capacity of 86,000 gallons. Id. at 
86. The Certified Tanks eliminated the environmental hazard associated with the Old 
Storage Tanks and brought Golden Eagle into compliance with State environmental 
regulations. Id. The total cost incurred by Golden Eagle to accomplish this was 
$55,944.00, to say nothing of the time and effort of its owners. Id. 
The City's Planning Commission Unanimously Endorses Installation of the 
Certified Tanks, On June 10, 1999, representatives from the City inspected the Property 
and informed Golden Eagle that it was required to obtain site plan approval from the City 
for the replacement of the tanks. Id. at 86. Golden Eagle disagreed and continues to 
maintain that no such approval was ever necessary under the City's zoning laws. Id. 
Nevertheless, to accommodate the City's request, on July 15, 1999 Golden Eagle paid the 
filing fee and submitted the requisite application. Id. 
At the August 10, 1999 hearing, the Planning Commission made extensive 
inquiries into aesthetic and safety issues relating to the replacement of the tanks. Id. 
Ultimately, the Planning Commission unanimously agreed that the changes created a 
more desirable situation on the Property and thus that Golden Eagle should be allowed to 
install the Certified Tanks pursuant to Woods Cross City Ordinance ["Ordinance"] § 12-
22-104(a). R.App. at 87. 
The City Council Rejects the Planning Commission's Unanimous Decision 
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and Demands that the Certified Tanks Be Removed. On October 6, 1999, the Woods 
Cross City Council rejected the Planning Commission's recommendation and refused to 
approve any pemiit relating to the placement of the Certified Tanks. Id. In a letter dated 
October 7, 1999, the City Administrator summarized the City Council's decision, 
including its view that "[sjince the old tanks had not been used for at least six years, 
under the Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance, they cannot be put back into use as a 
non-conforming use." The letter concluded: 
With these findings, the Woods Cross City Council has determined the old 
tanks removed from the site had been abandoned and [were] not eligible for 
reuse as a non-conforming use on the site. With this determination, any 
attempt to replace these abandoned tanks with new usable tanks can only be 
viewed as an expansion of a non-conforming use. . . . [T]he City Council 
has denied your request for the substitution of the tanks and has requested 
you to remove the six tanks from the site. This letter serves as an official 
notice that you have 14 days from receipt of this letter to remove the tanks. 
M a t 12. 
On November 5, 1999, Golden Eagle filed a Notice of Appeal and Statement of 
Grounds with the City Council. Id. On November 16, 1999, the City Council sent a letter 
to Golden Eagle stating that the Council had "choose[n] to take no action on [Golden 
Eagle's] request" and noting that since Golden Eagle had "exhausted all of [its] 
administrative remedies," if it "wish[ed] to contest the decision of the Council [it would] 
need to petition the courts . . . ." Id. This action followed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Storage tanks are an essential and integral part of Golden Eagle's used-oil 
reclamation operations, a nonconforming use under the City's Ordinance. Golden Eagle 
replaced 17 Old Storage Tanks with six newer Certified Tanks having less capacity 
because State environmental laws and State regulators required it to do so - not because 
the tanks were obsolete from an operational standpoint. Under these circumstances, the 
only reasonable and nonarbitrary reading of the City's nonconforming use Ordinance is 
that Golden Eagle must be allowed to install the six Certified Tanks. Case law addressing 
this exact issue, as well as elemental principles of due process, hold that where State 
health and safety laws require that a structure dedicated to a nonconforming use be 
modernized or replaced, the owner has a legal right to comply with State directives 
without forfeiting the right to continue the nonconforming use. An exception to this rule 
would arise if the proposed replacement structure would substantially exceed the scale of 
the original structure. Inasmuch as Golden Eagle was required by State law to replace the 
Old Tanks with more modem tanks, and since the new tanks are on substantially the same 
scale as the old ones, the district court's holding that the City's Ordinance mandated 
forfeiture of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use in the tanks was plainly erroneous. 
2. Moreover, the replacement of the Old Storage Tanks with the Certified 
Tanks is allowed by right under the Ordinance and State nonconforming use law because 
it does not constitute an enlargement, extension, or change of Golden Eagle's used oil 
recycling operations. The Certified Tanks actually have less storage capacity than the 
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Old Storage Tanks and there is absolutely no evidence that the Certified Tanks will have 
even the slightest adverse impact on neighboring properties. Indeed, all evidence is to the 
contrary. Further, even if it could be shown that the volume or intensity of Golden 
Eagle's nonconfomiing use would increase because of the Certified Tanks - a showing 
which the City has not made - numerous decisions hold that where the nature and 
character of the use remains substantially unchanged, such an increase does not constitute 
an illegal enlargement, extension, or change of the nonconfomiing use. The district court 
erred in holding otherwise. 
3. In the alternative, should this Court view the Certified Tanks as not being 
an integral part of Golden Eagle's larger nonconforming use, they are unquestionably a 
valid accessory use since they are subordinate and reasonably related to the primary use 
of the Property. The district court's holding to the contrary was incorrect and creates a 
significant injustice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MUST ALLOW PRIOR NONCONFORMING 
USES TO CONTINUE EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY STATE STATUTE. 
Serious due process and takings issues arise when a local government decrees that 
a preexisting use of land is no longer legal. See, e.g., Gibbons & Reed Company v. North 
Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559, 563 (Utah 1967) (Absent a nuisance, "a zoning ordinance 
which required the discontinuance forthwith of a nonconfomiing use would be a 
deprivation of property without due process of law."); see O 'Connor v. City of Moscow, 
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202 P.2d 401, 403 (Idaho 1949) ("An ordinance which prohibits the continuation of 
existing lawful businesses within a zoned area is unconstitutional as [a] taking of property 
without due process of law and being an unreasonable exercise of the police power."). To 
avoid such problems, and in the interest of fairness, the Utah Municipal Code constricts 
the manner in which local governments regulate prior nonconfomiing uses of land. State 
law allows prior nonconforming uses to continue but allows municipalities either to 
reasonably restrict their expansion or to terminate all such uses pursuant to a reasonable 
amortization period. Woods Cross City has chosen the former of these two options. 
A, Prior Nonconforming Uses Continue To Be Legal Unless the Local 
Government Elects to Phase Out All Nonconforming Uses Through a 
Reasonable Amortization Schedule. 
Despite a zoning change rendering particular land uses or structures illegal, State 
law guarantees property owners the right to continue a preexisting nonconforming use or 
structure4 - even in peipetuity - unless the municipality elects to follow a specified 
4The Utah Municipal Code specifically defines a legal nonconforming use: 
"Nonconfomiing use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning 
regulation governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with 
the zoning regulations that now govern the land. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(/). A nonconforming structure is similarly defined: 
"Nonconfomiing structure" means a structure that: 
(1) legally existed before its current zoning designation; and 
(2) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the 
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course. Section 10-9-408 of the Municipal Code plainly provides that "a nonconfomiing 
use or structure may be continued." This baseline rule governs unless the local 
government chooses to enact a zoning ordinance expressly phasing out all nonconforming 
uses pursuant to a reasonable amortization schedule that protects the owner's property 
interests: 
[The municipality may enact a zoning ordinance providing for] the 
termination of all nonconfomiing uses, except billboards, by providing a 
formula establishing a reasonable time period during which the owner can 
recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the nonconforming use, 
if any. 
Id. § 10-9-408(2)(b). 
B. State Law Allows Municipalities to Reasonably Limit the Extension 
and Expansion of Prior Nonconforming Uses. 
Although State law does not permit local governments to eliminate nonconfomiing 
uses without first providing a reasonable amortization period, the Municipal Code does 
allow municipalities to reasonably limit the extension or expansion of nonconforming 
. uses as well as the restoration or reconstruction of nonconforming structures: 
[The municipality may enact a zoning ordinance providing for] the 
establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, expansion, 
or substitution of nonconfomiing uses upon the terms and conditions set 
forth in the zoning ordinance. 
Id. § 10-9-408(2)(a). 
zoning regulation's setback, height restrictions, or other regulations that 
govern the structure. 
Id. § 10-9-103(£). 
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It is important to note the distinction between subsections (a) and (b) of § 10-9-
408(2). If a city makes the legislative decision to terminate all nonconfomiing uses 
within the jurisdiction, it may do so but will be governed by the reasonable phase-out 
period required by subsection (b). If a city elects not to enact a phase-out period, it may 
still reasonably regulate nonconfomiing uses, but it cannot tenninate them outright due to 
the provision stating that "a nonconfomiing use or stmcture may be continued." Id. at 10-
9-408(1 )(a). In other words, a municipality must choose its course. Utah law does not 
allow a municipality to use regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (a) to subvert 
or avoid the reasonable amortization period contemplated by subsection (b). Nor does it 
allow for the imposition of unreasonable or arbitrary regulations upon nonconforming 
uses in violation of constitutional due process requirements. See International Union v. 
Utah Labor Relations Board, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (Utah 1949) ("guarantee of due process" 
requires that "the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious"). Municipalities 
are obviously bound by the dictates of due process. 
II. WOODS CROSS CITY HAS ELECTED NOT TO TERMINATE ALL 
NONCONFORMING USES, BUT RATHER TO RESTRICT THEM. 
The City Council of Woods Cross City has made the legislative decision not to 
tenninate all prior nonconfomiing uses pursuant to the amortization requirements of § 
10-9-408(2)(b). Rather, the City has elected to allow such uses to continue under certain 
restrictions and conditions: 
Except as hereinafter specified, any use, building, or stmcture, lawfully 
existing at the time of the enactment or subsequent amendment of this 
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Ordinance, may be continued, even though such use, building or structure 
does not conform with the provisions of this Ordinance for the district in 
which it is located. 
Woods Cross City Ordinance § 12-22-102. Like many zoning ordinances, the Woods 
Cross ordinance limits the enlargement of nonconforming uses: 
A nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or changed unless the 
use is changed to a use permitted in the district in which it is located, and a 
nonconforming building shall not be reconstructed or structurally altered 
unless such alteration results in removing those conditions of the building 
which render it nonconforming, except as follows .... 
Id. § 12-22-104. The ordinances then lists a number of exceptions, one of which allows 
"[rjepairs and structural alterations necessary for building safety ... provided that the floor 
area of such building is not increased." Id. § 12-22-104(b). 
The City's ordinance also provides that once a nonconforming use - or the use of a 
structure designed for a nonconforming use - has ceased for one year or more, it cannot 
later be resumed: 
Cessation of Use. A use shall be deemed to have ceased when it has been 
discontinued either temporarily or permanently for a period of one year or 
more, whether or not with the intent to abandon said use, subject to the 
following provisions: 
(a) Cessation of Use of Building Designated or Designed for 
Nonconforming Use. Except for residential or accessory farm structure[s], 
a building or structure which was originally designed for a nonconforming 
use shall not be put to a nonconforming use again when such use has ceased 
for one year or more. 
Id. §12-22-106(a). As discussed below, the trial court's ruling was expressly based on an 
eiToneous interpretation of this latter provision. 
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III. IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT GOLDEN EAGLE'S OIL RECLAMATION 
OPERATIONS ARE AN ONGOING, LEGAL, NONCONFORMING USE 
WHICH INCLUDES THE STORAGE OF USED PETROLEUM 
PRODUCTS. 
The City freely acknowledges that Golden Eagle's oil reclamation operations are a 
legal, on-going nonconfomiing use under the Ordinance, a conclusion expressly affimied 
by the trial court. Add. at 20. What both the City and the trial court have refused to 
acknowledge, however, is that storage tanks - including those at issue here - are an 
integral part of that unquestionably legal nonconfomiing use. Cf. Hugoe v. Woods Cross 
City, 1999 UT Ct. App. 281, 988 P.2d 456, ^ 9 ("The use of the property for parking, 
storage, and staging activities is an integral part in the operation of a transfer company.") 
A key element of Golden Eagle's business is disposing of used petroleum products for its 
customers. Where possible, the used petroleum is cleansed of contaminants and refined 
into other useful products which Golden Eagle then markets. Where recycling is not 
possible or economically feasible, the used product is stored in tanks until such time as 
Golden Eagle sees fit to take it to a final disposal site. 
Thus, storage tanks - whether holding recyclable or nonrecyclable petroleum 
products - are indispensable to Golden Eagle's overall operations, which the City admits 
are legal. When the City authorized Golden Eagle to continue its refinery operations as a 
legal nonconforming use, it necessarily authorized Golden Eagle to employ the essential 
implements of those operations, including storage tanks. Otherwise the nonconforming 
use Ordinance would be totally unreasonable and thus a violation of due process. See 
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Gibbons, 431 P.2d at 562 (courts may "set aside" "unreasonable" zoning ordinance). 
It is important to note that the Ordinance in no way contemplates the micro-
management of businesses engaging in nonconforming uses; it imposes no limits, for 
instance, on increases in the volume or intensity of a nonconforming business. Moreover, 
State law does not appear to authorize a municipality to engage in such management. 
Thus, provided its nonconforming use remains within substantially the same bounds, the 
Ordinance is silent as to how Golden Eagle may manage its business. Whether and when 
to use a particular machine, tank, pipe, hose, truck, chemical, etc. in the refining process -
including whether to put usable or unusable petroleum products in one tank as opposed to 
another and whether to wait two weeks or two years before finally disposing of 
nonrecyclable petroleum products - are matters left entirely to the business judgment of 
Golden Eagle's owners and management. 
Further, the Ordinance does not purport to divide up the operations of an overall 
nonconforming use into numerous discrete nonconforming uses, each to be separately 
regulated or eliminated. As with any multi-part manufacturing operation, Golden Eagle's 
operations exist as an integrated whole. To hold otherwise, as the trial court essentially 
did, would lead to absurd and arbitrary results. For instance, the ordinance bars 
resumption of a nonconforming use if it ceases for a specified period of time. See Woods 
Cross City Ordinance § 12-22-106. If this were interpreted to apply to each discrete 
activity or piece of equipment within the operation, it might well require a factory to 
operate at full capacity or use every machine regardless of market conditions, lest it lose 
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whatever portion of its operations it failed to fully use. Such a requirement would be 
arbitrary and capricious, in violation of due process. Markets ebb and flow with supply 
and demand. Factories often throttle back their operations during economic downturns, 
sometimes for more than a year, returning to full capacity production when the business 
cycle swings back. A nonconfomiing use ordinance that lopped off whatever portion of a 
legal operation that was not in use for a specified period would violate due process. 
There is nothing in the City's nonconforming use Ordinance that requires such an 
arbitrary approach. Nevertheless, the City has essentially advanced this position 
throughout this litigation. The City contends that because the Old Storage Tanks 
allegedly were not used for more than a year, the tanks themselves ceased to be a legal 
nonconforming use. In fact, there was no such cessation of use, as demonstrated below. 
But regardless, for the reasons just explained, there is absolutely no warrant under the 
Ordinance for slicing up Golden Eagle's single nonconfomiing use into numerous little 
nonconfomiing uses which are then subject to termination for a year of nonuse. 
Maintaining storage tanks on the Property is not a separate nonconfomiing use or activity 
apart from the Golden Eagle's overall nonconfomiing use of oil reclamation. The use of 
tanks to store contaminated petroleum products is an integral and indispensable element 
of the legal nonconforming use. 
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IV. GOLDEN EAGLE CONTINUOUSLY USED ITS STORAGE TANKS AS AN 
INTEGRAL PART OF ITS OIL RECLAMATION OPERATIONS. 
Even assuming arguendo that the "Cessation of Use" provision in the Ordinance 
(§ 12-22-106) applies to discrete activities within a larger nonconforming use, it cannot 
reasonably be argued that Golden Eagle ceased to use its storage tanks for at least a year. 
Under any reasonable definition of the term "use," Golden Eagle has continuously used 
its storage tanks as an integral part of its oil reclamation operations. There is no basis for 
district court's ruling upholding the City's conclusion that use of the tanks had ceased for 
a year. 
It is undisputed that Golden Eagle continuously used the Old Storage Tanks to 
hold petroleum products up until the time that each tank was emptied, dismantled, and 
hauled away. See R. App. at 79, 84, 103, 187. By definition, a storage tank is "in use " if 
it is storing something, for that is its very purpose. The Old Storage Tanks were 
originally installed in order to store used petroleum products, either for later recycling or 
ultimate disposal. So long as these storage tanks were storing used petroleum products, 
their use did not cease. 
When the zoning changed in 1991, making the reclamation operations on the 
Property a nonconforming use, the Old Storage Tanks were already on the Property being 
used to store used petroleum products. Id. at 84, 101. The Old Storage Tanks were 
utilized to store used petroleum products when Merrill Maughan and Stan Hartmark 
purchased the facility in 1993 and were then used continuously for that purpose from that 
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time until each tank was emptied, dismantled, and hauled away and the new Certified 
Tanks were installed. Id. at 103-04. In fact, at the time the Old Storage Tanks were 
dismantled, Golden Eagle was required to remove 18,660 gallons of used petroleum 
products. The tank containing the least amount of material still held at least 500 gallons 
of used petroleum. Id. at 84-85. Therefore, every one of the Old Storage Tanks was in 
"use" continually from the zoning change in 1991 until the Old Storage Tanks were 
replaced with the new Certified Tanks. There wras no cessation of use. 
This straightforward understanding of the term "in use" is consistent with the Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision in V-l Oil v. Dept. of Environ. Quality, 904 P.2d 214 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). In V-l Oil, the plaintiff claimed that an underground storage tank did not 
need to be registered with the Department of Environmental Quality because it was not 
"in use." The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Hazardous Waste Control Board's 
decision that "a tank is 'in use' if it contains a regulated substance or petroleum. The tank 
need not be used to dispense petroleum; it need only be used to store or contain 
petroleum in order to be 'in use.'" Id. at 217 (emphasis added). 
In the proceedings below, the City acknowledged that the Old Storage Tanks held 
petroleum products continuously until their removal, but contended that they were not "in 
use" after 1993 because no new petroleum products were added to the tanks after that 
time. Under this cramped reading of the Ordinance, a storage tank is only "used" if the 
contents are regularly rotated (i.e., added and then removed from the tank). Such an 
argument conflicts with V-l Oil as well as with State regulations governing the closure of 
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used oil storage tanks.5 It also violates a commonsense reading of the Ordinance. 
Storage tanks are in use when they are storing. Cf. Gibbons & Reed Company, 431 P.2d 
at 563 (concept of'"use"' must comport with "the realities of the business"). 
The City's rotation argument raises additional conceptual problems. Under the 
City's interpretation, any legal nonconforming business would be required to rotate any 
stored inventory or materials at least once each year. If the stored material or products 
did not change for a year, the argument goes, the City could then prevent the company 
from using their storage facilities based upon a purported cessation of use. That is clearly 
an unreasonable interpretation of the City's cessation of use provision, especially since 
the Ordinance does not purport to micromanage the affairs of lawful businesses. As long 
The Standards for Use Oil Processors and Re-Refiners, outlined in Utah 
Administrative Code R315-15-5 provide in part: 
(f) Closure. 
(1) Aboveground tanks. Owners and operators who store or process used 
oil in aboveground tanks shall comply with the following requirements: 
(i) At closure of a tank system, the owner or operator shall remove or 
decontaminate used oil residues in tanks, contaminated containment system 
components, contaminated soils, and structures and equipment 
contaminated with used oil, and manage them as hazardous waste, unless 
the materials are not hazardous waste under this chapter. 
Utah Admin. Code R315-14-5.5(f). Accordingly, a tank system is not considered 
"closed" until all of the used oil residues are removed from the tank and all contaminated 
system components are properly disposed of. The rules relating to used oil also prohibits 
the disposal of "an item . . . that contains de minimis amounts of oil" unless "all oil has 
been removed from the item" and "[n]o free flowing oil remains in the item or 
substance." Utah Admin. Code R315-14-1.5. Essentially, used oil storage containers are 
considered in use and subject to regulation until they are properly emptied and disposed 
of in accordance with these rules. 
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as storing petroleum products in tanks is an integral part of Golden Eagle's legal 
nonconforming use, and provided safety concerns are not at issue, how long Golden 
Eagle waits to dispose of unusable oil is an issue of the internal operation of its business 
and not a matter of zoning law. 
V. BECAUSE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS REQUIRED 
GOLDEN EAGLE TO REPLACE THE OLD STORAGE TANKS, GOLDEN 
EAGLE HAD A LEGAL RIGHT TO INSTALL THE NEW TANKS 
PROVIDED THAT ITS OPERATIONS WOULD REMAIN ON 
SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME SCALE; REMOVAL OF THE OLD 
STORAGE TANKS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES CANNOT 
REASONABLY BE INTERPRETED AS A "CESSATION OF USE" UNDER 
THE WOODS CROSS ORDINANCE. 
The trial court rejected Golden Eagle's reliance on the commonsense definition of 
"in use" adopted in V-l Oil Co. Add. at 14. However, the court did not expressly adopt 
the City's position. Instead, the court upheld the City's action on a basis that the City had 
never really advanced in its briefing: that because the Old Storage Tanks had been 
removed from the Property and replaced by the Certified Tanks, the use of the Old 
Storage Tanks had permanently ceased. Add. at 16-17. Central to the court's decision 
was the fundamental misconception that Golden Eagle "voluntarily chose to drain and 
dispose of the waste [in the Old Storage Tanks] and physically remove the tanks from the 
Property." Add. at 17 (emphasis added). The trial court held: "The Court finds that 
voluntaiy demolition of a structure constitutes a permanent discontinuance of that 
structure under § 12-22-106 of the Woods Cross Ordinance, and in essence, constitutes a 
permanent abandonment." Add. at 17 (emphasis added). 
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This holding was patently contrary to the evidence. Golden Eagle did not 
"voluntarily" dispose of the Old Storage Tanks - it was required to do so by the State's 
Department of Environmental Quality in order to comply with new State environmental 
regulations. As explained below, under such circumstances case law holds that Golden 
Eagle retained the right to install the Certified Tanks provided its operations would 
remain on substantially the same scale, which they clearly would. Precluding installation 
of the Certified Tanks under these facts constitutes an unreasonable and arbitrary 
application of the City's Ordinance. The trial court's holding is also against public policy 
and threatens to undermine the State's environmental regulations. Good citizens like the 
owners of Golden Eagle should be encouraged to comply with State environmental 
regulations, not punished by unreasonably harsh interpretations of local zoning 
ordinances when they do so. 
A, Golden Eagle Replaced the Old Storage Tanks With the Certified 
Tanks in Order to Comply with State Environmental Regulations. 
The district court's finding that Golden Eagle "voluntarily" chose to "physically 
remove the tanks from the Property" is directly contrary to the undisputed facts. 
Compliance with State environmental regulations governing hazardous waste is obviously 
not voluntary - it's the law. In the briefing on summary judgment, the City did not 
dispute that "[t]here was no feasible method of upgrading the [Old] Storage Tanks to 
bring them into compliance with the new environmental regulations," and that "[t]he only 
way to bring the [Old] Storage Tanks in[to] compliance with the new environmental 
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regulations was to remove them, pour concrete basins, and replace the [Old] Storage 
Tanks with more modem tanks." R. App. at 84 (Golden Eagle's "Statement of Facts as to 
Which No Genuine Issue Exists," ^ f 26) (emphasis added); cf. R. App. at 131-33 (City's 
Memorandum in Opposition does not dispute this fact). The trial court's finding directly 
contradicted the undisputed facts and thus was error. 
This is a critically important point. From a purely operational perspective, the Old 
Storage Tanks were fully functional; there has never been any suggestion to the contrary. 
Fifty years ago, tanks like these would have continued to be used as an integral part of the 
reclamation operations for years to come, minor leaks notwithstanding. The issue with 
the tanks was not whether they had worn out from an operational standpoint, but whether 
they could be made to comply with new and stricter State environmental regulations 
designed to prevent contamination of the soil and water. As it turned out, compliance 
with the new regulations required the replacement of the old (but still usable) tanks with 
new tanks. 
B. The Ordinance Should Not Be Read to Prevent the Replacement of 
Equipment When Replacement Is Necessary to Comply with State 
Environmental Regulations. 
1. The Text of the Ordinance Itself Does Not Require the Interpretation 
Given by the Trial Court. 
There is no reason to interpret the City's Ordinance in a way that creates the harsh 
and counterproductive result created by the decision below. Section 12-22-106(a), on 
which the district court's ruling is based, clearly contemplates the scenario where a 
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structure is left unused for a year or is simply torn down. It is silent about instances like 
this, where replacement of a stmcture is necessary to comply with new State 
environmental, health, or safety regulations. 
However, § 12-22- 104(A) indicates that allowing the owner to replace the stmcture 
under circumstances such as this is fully consistent with the Ordinance. Section 12-22-
104(b) specifically allows the owner to make "[r]epairs and structural alterations 
necessaiyfor building safety" provided "that the floor area of [a nonconforming 
building] is not increased." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, § 12-22-102 of the Ordinance 
provides that "nothing in this Chapter shall prevent or discourage the strengthening or 
restoring to a safe condition o[f] any part of any building or stmcture declared unsafe by 
proper authority." 
These provisions should be read to apply to the instant situation. Replacing the 
Old Storage Tanks was necessary to correct problems with hazardous waste, a significant 
"safety" issue by any reckoning; indeed, that was the only way they could be "restor[ed] 
to a safe condition." State regulators had determined that the tanks were not in 
compliance with State environmental regulations, i.e., that the tanks were 
environmentally "unsafe." And upon replacement, the total storage capacity of the tanks 
was "not increased" but rather decreased by 86,000 gallons. 
Courts have the duty to interpret statutes so as to avoid unconstitutional or 
arbitrary results. See State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982). This Court 
must avoid such an interpretation of the Ordinance in this case. The most sensible 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reading of § 12-22-106 in light of the whole Ordinance is that it does not preclude the 
outcome here. In the absence of a clear statutoiy indication to the contraiy, the Ordinance 
should not be read to produce the unjust result imposed by the City and upheld by the 
district court. 
2. Case Law Holds That the Replacement of a Structure to Comply 
with State Regulations Does Not Preclude Reconstruction Provided 
That the Nonconforming Use Remains on Substantially the Same 
Scale. 
Utah's courts have never addressed the situation where a municipality strips a 
landowner of a vested right to a structure dedicated to a nonconforming use because the 
landowner endeavored to comply with State health, safety, or environmental regulations. 
Such scenarios appear to be exceedingly rare, no doubt due to the obvious unfairness. 
Yet, the case law that does exist strongly supports Golden Eagle's position. In 
Application and Appeal ofO 'Neal, 92 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. 1956), the city building inspector 
and the Commission of Public Welfare notified the owners of a nursing home, a legal 
nonconforming use, that they would not be allowed to continue operations unless they 
complied with state building code regulations requiring fireproof facilities. Id. at 191. In 
response, the owners applied to the city for a permit to replace the old frame building 
with a brick structure that complied with the state building code, but the permit was 
denied. Id. at 192. As here, the city had an ordinance providing that "[n]o non-
conforming use may be reestablished in any building or on any premises where such 
nonconforming use has been discontinued for a period of one year." Id. at 193. 
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On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted "that the new construction 
proposed by petitioners [the owners] is not by reason of their choice or voluntary act, but 
is necessary to meet the requirements of the 1936 North Carolina Building Code." Id. at 
195. The court held that under those circumstances the owners had a "right" to a building 
permit allowing them to replace the old structure with a new one, provided the new 
structure would be on substantially the same scale as the old: 
So far as the nursing home ban in a Residence 1 [zone] is concerned, 
we conclude that petitioners have the legal right to construct or reconstruct 
a fireproof building where their present frame building is situated, or in lieu 
thereof to construct a fireproof building elsewhere on said Lot 1, subject to 
the limitation that the reconstructed or new building in respect of the 
accommodations provided will provide facilities for the operation of a 
nursing home on substantially the same scale as that heretofore operated by 
petitioners. 
* # * * 
If, upon submission of detailed plans and specifications, it appears that the 
new fireproof building will be a facility, comparable in size for the 
operation of a nursing home on substantially the same scale as that in 
operation when the ordinance was adopted, the permit for the construction 
and occupation thereof within such limitations should be granted as a 
matter of right. 
Id. at 195-96 (emphasis added). 
The court in Calcasieu Parish Police Jury v. Bouillon, 432 So.2d 1181 (La. App. 
1983), addressed a similar situation and reached the same result. There, changes in state 
health laws required a wholesaler of seafood to alter how it packaged and processed 
seafood. To comply with the new state standards, the wholesaler needed to construct an 
additional room at its packing facility, a structure dedicated to a legal nonconforming use. 
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Id. at 1181-82. After consultation with state health authorities, the owner built the 
additional room. Local zoning authorities later sued on the ground that the addition was 
an extension of a nonconfomiing use proscribed by the zoning ordinance. Id. at 1182. 
The owner maintained that because "Health Department regulations required him to 
provide a[n] [additional] room for his packaging process, [the] addition was not in 
violation of the zoning ordinance." Id. On appeal, the court agreed, holding that since 
the extension was required by law it was legal under the zoning ordinance. Id. at 1183.6 
The same principle applies here. As with the old nursing home in O 'NeaL Golden 
Eagle's Old Storage Tanks had to be replaced to comply with new State regulations. 
Installation of the Certified Tanks was not merely a "voluntary act" but rather one 
required by State law. Cf. 0 'Neal, 92 S.E.2d at 195. Accordingly, Golden Eagle has a 
"legal right" to install tanks that will comply with State regulations provided its 
nonconfomiing use will remain "on substantially the same scale" as before. Id. at 195-96. 
This rule is strongly supported by established Utah law, public policy 
considerations, and basic notions of due process. First, it goes without saying that to the 
extent local laws or decisions conflict with or undermine State laws or regulations, the 
State laws must prevail. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Utah 1980) ("[L]ocal 
governments are without authority to pass any ordinance prohibited by, or in conflict 
6The zoning ordinance had a proviso allowing a nonconfomiing use to be enlarged 
"when required to do so by law or by ordinance." Id. at 1182 n.2. This provision 
resembles the caveats in §§ 12-22-102 & 12-22-104(b) of the Ordinance at issue here, 
which allow for restorations and repairs to alleviate safety concerns. 
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with, state statutory law."); Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 201, 7 P.3d 
789, If 4, rev. granted, 11 P.3d 708 (Utah 2000) (ordinances invalid if "inconsistent or 
conflict with state law"). Here, State law required what the City has attempted to prevent. 
Second, the mle encourages and facilitates compliance with vital State health, safety, and 
environmental regulations.7 Absent such a rule, property owners will have a strong 
incentive to avoid compliance lest they lose their right to their nonconforming uses. 
Third, the rule is narrow and well defined. As was the case in O 'Neal, the "decision 
[here] need not extend beyond" the "factual situation" where replacement of an old 
structure is required to comply with State regulations. O'Neal, 92 S.E.2d at 195. Such 
instances do not arise often and thus are not likely to undermine local policies regarding 
nonconforming uses. And lastly, the rule is required by basic norms of fairness and due 
process. Courts must not permit government to force citizens into a proverbial "Catch-
22," where compliance with one law requires the breaking of another or the forfeiture of 
vested rights. That is not only arbitrary and capricious, it is simply wrong. Yet it is 
precisely the outcome created by the City and affirmed by the district court. 
7In light of environmental concerns attending the disposal of used oil, Golden 
Eagle's recycling operations clearly advance the public interest. As this Court explained 
in Gibbons & Reed Company, in analyzing the reasonableness of a prohibition on a 
nonconforming use, the court "must also consider the loss to the public in general" of the 
"beneficial use" to which the property is being put. 431 P.2d at 563. 
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3. Golden Eagle's Nonconforming Use Will Remain on "Substantially 
the Same Scale" as Before Despite the Replacement of the Old 
Storage Tanks With the Certified Tanks. 
There is no evidence that the replacement of the Old Storage Tanks with the 
Certified Tanks will substantially alter the scale of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use. 
As before, Golden Eagle will use the Certified Tanks to store used petroleum products. 
Total storage capacity will have actually decreased. The quantity and quality of the 
petroleum products actually stored in the tanks will depend on customer needs and 
internal and external market conditions, just as before the State required the new tanks. 
Whether a tank is half empty or filled to capacity, it occupies the same space and 
produces the same visual impact on neighboring properties. Golden Eagle has not 
proposed any physical expansion of its operations or business in light of whatever 
increases in efficiency or productivity might result from better tanks, and there is no 
evidence such an expansion would result.8 In fact, the impact of Golden Eagle's 
reclamation activities on the Property itself, as well as the surrounding properties, will 
almost certainly decrease due to the elimination of a significant environmental hazard. 
Other changes have been made incident to the installation of the new tanks which will 
make the Property more aesthetically pleasing, further reducing the Property's adverse 
impacts on the neighbors. See R. App. at 86; cf. Gibbons & Reed Company, 431 P.2d at 
8It is possible that some additional oil will be recycled with the Certified Tanks due 
to efficiency increases, but there is no actual evidence of that. The exact volume of used 
petroleum products which Golden Eagle processes obviously depends on many variables, 
only one of which is the capacity of its plant. 
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563 (fact that gravel operations would not have "any substantial adverse effect upon the 
value of [neighboring] properties]" important factor in nonconfomiing use analysis). 
In short, if allowed to install the Certified Tanks in compliance with State 
regulations, Golden Eagle's reclamation operations will remain on "substantially the 
same scale" as before. There is no evidence to the contrary. As such, Golden Eagle has 
the "legal right" to install the Certified Tanks. The district court erred as a matter of law 
in interpreting the City' Ordinance as precluding the installation of the Certified Tanks. 
VI. GOLDEN EAGLE'S REPLACEMENT OF THE OLD TANKS WITH THE 
CERTIFIED TANKS DID NOT ENLARGE, EXTEND, OR CHANGE 
GOLDEN EAGLE'S NONCONFORMING USE AND THEREFORE MUST 
BE PERMITTED UNDER THE CITY'S ZONING ORDINANCE. 
The district court also erred in holding that installation of the Certified Tanks "acts 
as an enlargement of [Golden Eagle's] nonconfomiing use of [the] property." Add. at 20. 
Both Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 and § 12-22-102 of the City's Ordinance allow a 
nonconfomiing use to continue. Section 12-22-104 of the City's Ordinance prohibits 
enlarging, extending, or changing a nonconforming use except in certain specified 
circumstances. Thus, if the installation of the Certified Tanks does not constitute an 
enlargement, extension, or change of the nonconfomiing use (i.e., the operation of an oil 
reclamation facility), the City had no legal authority to prohibit the installation. 
Many courts have held that a nonconforming use need not remain static. Merely 
intensifying or modernizing a nonconfomiing use - for example, through substituting 
more modem equipment and thereby increasing the output of an operation - does not 
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generally constitute an "enlargement" or "extension" of the nonconforming use where the 
nature and character of the use are not substantially changed. Nevertheless, the district 
court held that any modernization of the tanks on the Property would necessarily 
constitute an enlargement of the nonconforming use. See Add. at 18-21. Although Utah 
courts have never directly addressed this issue, numerous decisions from other 
jurisdictions demonstrate that the court below was entirely mistaken, especially where, as 
here, there are no express provisions in the ordinance regulating the volume or intensity 
of a nonconforming use. 
In Keller v. City ofBellingham, 600 P.2d 1276 (Wash. 1979), Georgia-Pacific 
Corporation ("GP") desired to improve its chlor-alkali facility by adding inter alia six 
new electrolytic cells. Id. at 1278. Each cell was a "troughlike structure^ measuring 
some 50 feet in length, 5 feet in width and about 1 foot in depth." Id. The new cells were 
"forecast to increase chlorine production [at the plant] by 20 to 25 percent." Id. Much as 
here, opponents argued that the addition of the new equipment to GP's nonconforming 
use constituted an illegal "enlargement" of that use. The Washington Supreme Court 
disagreed. The court first noted that the "zoning ordinance could have specifically 
prohibited intensification of a nonconforming use by reference to a specified volume of 
such use, [but] it did not do so," choosing instead to limit its "enlargement." Id. at 1279. 
The established rule is that within reasonable limits increasing the volume or intensity of 
the nonconforming use is not a prohibited "enlargement" of the use: 
Intensification [of a nonconforming use] is permissible [i.e., does not 
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constitute a prohibited "enlargement"] where the nature and character of the 
use is unchanged and substantially the same facilities are used. The test is 
whether the intensified use is 'different in kind' from the nonconforming 
use in existence when the zoning ordinance was adopted. 
Id. at 1280 (internal citations omitted). Because the extra cells "wrought no change in the 
nature or character of the nonconforming use," the court held that there had been no 
prohibited "enlargement" of that use. Id. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Idaho in Gordon Paving Company v. Blain 
County Board of County Commissioners, 572 P.2d 164 (Idaho 1997), addressed whether 
the modernization of an asphalt plant constituted an enlargement or extension of a 
nonconforming use.9 The court noted that where a "reasonable substitution of more 
modem facilities for obsolescent equipment" is at issue, generally "such a substitution 
does not constitute an enlargement or extension" of the nonconforming use. Id. at 166 
(citing authorities). The same is true, the court held, for increases in the plant's "volume 
of output" due to the "greater efficiency of the modernized equipment," especially where 
the "environmental impact of the use is substantially reduced despite the increase in 
volume." Id. The court reasoned: 
Case law in other jurisdictions has held that as a matter of law an increase 
in the volume of use is not an enlargement or extension. The same result 
9The ordinance also required a variance for "nonconforming changes of use" as 
well as for "enlargements or extensions" of a nonconforming use. Id. at 165. Although 
the county did not argue that a prohibited "change" in use was at issue, the court noted 
that "[a]s a matter of law, no change of use occurred" since both before and after the 
modernization the company was "engaged in asphalt production by the same basic 
process." Id. at 166 n.l. 
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must certainly inhere when increased volume is accompanied by a greater 
compatibility with the surrounding locale. 
Id. (citation omitted). Not having enlarged or extended its nonconfomiing use, the court 
held that the property owner was not required to seek a variance for is plant 
modernization. 
In an extensive analysis, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Derby 
Refining Company v. City of Chelsea, 555 N.E.2d 534 (Mass. 1990), addressed the issue 
of what constitutes a "change" or "extension" of a nonconforming use in a case with 
striking parallels to the instant case. The suit involved a petroleum storage facility that 
existed as a legal nonconforming use. Id. at 536. The new owner, Belcher, decided that 
the best use of the property was as a liquid asphalt storage facility, which required the 
installation of "a hot oil heating system to heat the tanks and pipes so that the asphalt 
could be preserved in a liquid state for pumping." Id. at 536-37. Belcher also "insulated 
the exteriors of three of the storage tanks to prevent heat loss, added scales to the truck-
loading dock, and made various other modifications to the pipes, valves, and tanks." Id. 
Following changes in the zoning law, a dispute arose about whether the new equipment 
and facilities constituted a prohibited "change or substantial extension" of the prior 
owner's nonconfomiing use. To answer that question, the supreme court employed a 
"three-part test": 
(1) Whether the [current] use reflects the nature and purpose of the [prior] 
use, (2) Whether there is a difference in the quality or character, as well as 
the degree, of use, and (3) Whether the current use is different in kind in its 
effect on the neighborhood. 
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Id. at 539 (brackets supplied by the court; internal quotation marks omitted). 
Echoing arguments made here, on the first prong of the test ("[njature and purpose 
of the use") the opponents maintained that the ordinance was violated because "the use of 
the facility has changed from the storage of fuel products to storage of a building material 
[asphalt]." Id. at 540. The court flatly rejected this argument: 
In the absence of a demonstrated difference in neighborhood impact [which 
was never shown] the fact that the product being delivered, stored, and 
distributed has changed from one petroleum product to another petroleum 
product does not mandate a conclusion that a change in the nature or 
purpose of the use has occurred. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
On the second prong of the test ("[q]uality, character, and degree of use"), the 
opponents argued that "the character of the storage activities occurring on the property 
has changed due to the fact that liquid asphalt must be kept heated," a process which "has 
required substantial physical alternation to the facility, including the erection of two 
smokestacks." Id. at 540-41. In rejecting this argument, the court first noted the rule that 
a valid nonconforming use does not lose that status merely because it is 
improved and made more efficient, provided, however, that the changes are 
ordinarily and reasonably adapted to the original use and do not constitute 
a change in the original nature and puipose of the undertaking. 
Id. at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted). Having already concluded that no change 
in the nature of the use had occurred, the court then held that the "modifications" were 
"'ordinarily and reasonably adapted'" to the original use: 
It is undisputed that liquid asphalt must be heated in order to prevent 
solidification, and that the modifications Belcher made to the facility were 
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designed solely to accomplish that end. There is nothing to suggest that 
those changes were either extraordinaiy or unreasonable or that they 
changed the fundamental nature of the original enterprise. 
Id. (emphasis added). Lastly, the court held that the third prong ("[neighborhood 
impact") was satisfied because the evidence indicated that Belcher's use is "'not different 
in kind in its effect on the neighborhood'" as compared with the prior use. Id. at 542. 
Numerous other courts have reached similar conclusions when addressing the issue 
whether improving, modernizing, or intensifying a use (or structures related to that use) 
constitutes a prohibited enlargement, change, or extension of a nonconforming use.10 
As already demonstrated, there is no evidence that the Certified Tanks will impose 
]0See, e.g., Town ofSeabrook v. DAgata, 362 A.2d 182, 183 (N.H. 1976) 
(ordinance prohibiting the "expansion" of a nonconforming use; "Although the general 
policy of zoning is to carefully limit the extension and enlargement of nonconforming 
uses, a town may not interpret a use in such a way as to unlawfully reduce the original 
vested interest acquired by the owner. [Citation.] The fact that improved and more 
efficient or different instrumentalities are used in the operation of the use does not in 
itself preclude the use made from being a continuation of the prior nonconforming use 
providing such means are ordinarily and reasonably adapted to make the established use 
available to the owners and the original nature and purpose of the undertaking remain 
unchanged."); Zeiders v. Zoning Hearing Board of Adjustment of West Hanover 
Township, 397 A.2d 20, 22 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1979) (modernization of nonconforming use 
must be granted as a "reasonable continuance of a nonconforming use ... unless such a 
modernization is found injurious to the public health, safety or welfare"); City of Spring 
Valley v. Hurst, 530 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (permit to construct building 
dedicated to nonconforming use must be granted where nonconforming use will not be 
"extended" but rather business will continue as before, noise level of current activities 
will be reduced, no new or added activities will be earned out, and no evidence that 
volume of business will be increased); see also Siver v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 255 
A.2d 506, 507 (Pa. 1969) (doctrine of natural expansion of nonconforming use as dictates 
of business or modernization require is a constitutional right protected by due process of 
law, but the contemplated expansion must not be detrimental to public health, welfare and 
safety). 
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a substantial additional impact on the Property or the neighboring properties, much less 
that the nature and character of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use will be substantially 
changed. The evidence shows precisely the opposite, in fact. Installation of the Certified 
Tanks will result in less environmental contamination and less visual impact, thus 
reducing the impact of the nonconforming use.11 And it cannot be denied that "the nature 
and character of the use [will be] unchanged and [that] substantially the same facilities 
[will be] used" once the Certified Tanks are installed. Keller, 600 P.2d at 1280. Even 
assuming arguendo an intensification of Golden Eagle's use, "the intensified use [will not 
be] 'different in kind' from the nonconforming use in existence when the zoning 
ordinance was adopted." Id. at 1280 (internal citations omitted). And even further 
assuming that the petroleum products to be stored in the Certified Tanks will differ 
somewhat from the used oil in the Old Storage Tanks,12 as the court in Derby Refining 
Company held, "the fact that the product being delivered, stored, and distributed has 
changed from one petroleum product to another petroleum product does not mandate a 
nThe court below purported to find that the Certified Tanks increased Golden 
Eagle's storage capacity by 116,000, but that was simply wrong. The undisputed 
evidence is that the Certified Tanks have less capacity than the tanks they replaced, not 
more. See R. App. at 86. Whatever restrictions State regulators may have placed on the 
use of the Old Storage Tanks pending environmental upgrades did not reduce the capacity 
of those tanks. 
12Except in the trivial sense that used oil from different sources is unlikely to be 
chemically identical, there is no evidence that the used oil to be put in the Certified Tanks 
will differ substantially from what was in the Old Storage Tanks. The district court's 
suggestions to the contrary were without factual basis. 
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conclusion that a change in the nature or puipose of the use has occurred." 555 N.E.2d at 
540. 
Thus, under the many cases cited above, the mere replacing of the Old Storage 
Tanks with the Certified Tanks did not constitute an "enlargement" of Golden Eagle's 
nonconforming use. As such, the City's Ordinance did not preclude installation of the 
Certified Tanks. The district court's conclusion to the contrary was plainly incorrect. 
VII. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, STORAGE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN 
THE CERTIFIED TANKS IS A VALID ACCESSORY USE 
In the event the Court agrees with the district court's implicit holding that storing 
used petroleum products is somehow a separate use from Golden Eagle's primary 
reclamation activities, there can be no question that the Certified Tanks would constitute 
(in the alternative) a lawful accessory use. 
A, The Doctrine of Accessory Uses Allows Incidental, Subordinate Uses 
Golden Eagle is entitled to utilize the Certified Tanks to store petroleum products 
as a use which is accessory to the primary nonconforming use of operating an oil 
reclamation facility. The doctrine of accessory uses has been described as follows: 
Under the Doctrine of Accessory Uses, a landowner is permitted to 
maintain an accessory or incidental use in connection with a permitted use 
of land if the accessory use is truly incidental to the primary nonconforming 
use and does not change the basic nature of the use of the property. 
Atkins v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Union County, 281 S.E.2d 756, 760 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1981). Consistent with this statement, the City's Ordinance contains the following 
definition of "accessory use": 
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The term "accessory use" shall mean a use which is incidental to and 
subordinate to the prescribed permitted use within any respective zoning 
provisions. 
Woods Cross City Ordinances § 12-2-103. Accessory uses are permitted even if the 
applicable zoning ordinance is silent concerning such uses. Pratt v. Building Inspector of 
Gloucester, 113 N.E.2d 816, 816-17 (Mass. 1953) (considering accessory use argument 
"even though the ordinance does not expressly permit accessory uses"); City of Sheridan 
v. Keen, 524 P.2d 1390, 1392 (Colo. 1974). ("an accessory use is one which is deemed to 
be permitted by implication where the ordinance is silent on the particular use in issue"). 
B. Permissible Accessory Uses are Distinguishable From Unlawful 
Expansions. 
"[A] lawful nonconforming use may be validly expanded by a reasonable 
accessory use which is not detrimental to the public health, welfare, or safety." Jackson 
v. Pottstown Zoning Board of Adjustment, 233 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 1967). The distinction 
between an impermissible extension of a nonconforming use and a permissible accessory 
use has been described as follows: 
The criterion for determining that a modification is an accessory use rather 
than an extension is that the modification is 'a use customarily incidental 
and subordinate to the main or principal use' . . . or, in other words, a minor 
use of the property, commonly established as being reasonably related to 
the primary use. 
Maloy v. Town ofGuiderland, 461 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
Thus, in determining whether a use is an accessory use, the court may consider the 
following factors: (1) whether the use is customarily incidental to the primary use; (2) 
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whether the use is subordinate to the primary use; (3) whether the use is reasonably 
related to the primary use; (4) whether the use is a minor use of the property; and (5) 
whether the use is reasonable. 
In the present case, the installation of the Certified Tanks meets all of these 
criteria. To the extent the trial court is correct that some distinction can be drawn 
between Golden Eagle's reclamation operation and the storage of used petroleum 
products, the storage of petroleum products would necessarily be incidental to and 
subordinate to the primary use of recycling used oil. Storage of used oil is reasonably 
related to the recycling of such oil, and constitutes only a minor use of the property. 
Finally, it is completely reasonable to allow a recycling facility to store the very material 
which it ultimately recycles; tanks are a necessary implement of the recycling process. 
Thus, Golden Eagle's use of the Certified Tanks constitutes a permissible accessory use. 
The decision in Gauthier v. Village ofLarchmont, 291 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1968), is instructive. In that case, the property in question had been operated as a 
hotel for over 80 years, with a portion of the premises being used as a bar until 1919. 
"From 1919 to 1933, although the hotel remained in operation, the bar was closed 
because of the National Prohibition Act. However, the equipment therein remained intact 
and that portion of the hotel was used for storage." Id. at 586. In 1921 the village 
enacted a zoning ordinance prohibiting hotels in the relevant zoning district. 
Subsequently, the village claimed that the bar did not have status as a vested 
nonconforming use because it was not being used when the ordinance was enacted. The 
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court rejected this argument: 
[T]he contention is meritless in a situation where the principal use was in 
existence prior to the zoning ordinance and was not abandoned. . . . We are 
of the opinion that the nonconfomiing use attached to the hotel as an entity 
and the latter embodies the bar as an accessory use. . . . Clearly, the service 
of liquor refreshment is inseparable from a modern hotel and as a matter of 
law a bar therein is an accessory use. . . . Consequently, as the hotel 
continued operations during 1919-1933, the right to resume liquor sales was 
not abandoned. Cessation of the accessory use caused by circumstances 
beyond the control of the user is not sufficient to establish abandonment 
(2 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning (3d ed.), pp. 61-9, 61-11). . . . We are 
also of the opinion that there was not an abandonment due to the voluntary 
termination of liquor sales during the years of 1957-1963. . . . [H]ere the 
principal use was never discontinued. For these reasons the resumption of 
liquor sales in 1964 was not an extension of the nonconfomiing use. . . . 
The resumption of that activity did not cause a fundamental change in the 
use . . . , as liquor had been lawfully sold on the premises before and we 
have earlier concluded that such activity constitutes an essential and integral 
part of the principal use . . . . 
Id. at 587-88 (emphasis added). 
In Gauthier, the sale of liquor had been terminated once as a result of prohibition 
and a second time on a voluntary basis. Nonetheless, the court allowed the property 
owner to continue selling liquor as an accessory use. In the present case, any cessation of 
use of the Old Storage Tanks was mandated by new State environmental laws and 
regulations. Under the rationale of Gauthier, Golden Eagle is entitled to utilize the 
Certified Tanks for the accessory use of storing used petroleum products. 
C. The District Court's Accessory Use Holding Was Erroneous, 
In the Memorandum Decision, the district court acknowledged that "[a] lawful 
nonconfomiing use may be validly expanded by a reasonable accessory use which is not 
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detrimental to public health, welfare, or safety." Add. at 20. Nevertheless, the court held 
as follows: 
[T]he Court does not find the installation of the six Certified tanks with a 
storage capacity of 116,000 gallons to be "reasonable," "incidental," or 
"subordinate" to the use of the Property. Instead, it substantially expands 
the use of the Property to store an additional 116,000 gallons of recyclable 
oil. A change in storage capacity is not permissible when the spirit of the 
zoning act was to restrict, rather than increase any nonconforming use. 
Home Fuel Oil Co. v. Glen Rock, 118 NJL 340, 192 A 516. Therefore, the 
Court does not find the Certified Tanks to be an accessory use. 
Add. at 20. 
This holding is erroneous in three respects. First, the trial court disregarded the 
undisputed fact that "Golden Eagle removed the 17 [Old] Storage Tanks with a combined 
capacity of 202,000 gallons and replaced them with 6 Certified Tanks with a combined 
capacity of 116,000 gallons." R. App. at 86 flf 36). It is undisputed that the replacement 
of the Old Storage Tanks with the Certified Tanks reduced the number of tanks by 11 and 
decreased Golden Eagle's used oil storage capacity by 86,000 gallons. The district 
court's holding was plainly mistaken in this regard; the replacement of the tanks did not 
"substantially expandf] the use of the Property." Add. at 20. 
Second, as explained more fully below, the mere summoning of the "spirit of the 
zoning act" does not override a property owner's express right under the Ordinance to 
include accessory, incidental uses in conjunction with the primary nonconforming use. 
And even if the Ordinance's purported purpose of restricting nonconforming uses were 
relevant, the reduction in the number and capacity of tanks is certainly consistent with 
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that puipose. It should also be noted that the present case differs significantly from Home 
Fuel Oil, 192 A.516 (N.J. Super. 1937), which trial court cited. The property owner in 
Home Fuel Oil was seeking to "increase the storage capacity [of its operations] from 
about one hundred thousand gallons to four hundred and forty thousand gallons," not 
decrease the storage capacity, as here. Id. at 518. Moreover, Home Fuel Oil did not 
address issues of accessory use. 
Third, the district court's accessory use analysis focused on the installation of the 
tanks rather than the proposed use of the tanks. Add. at 20. The relevant accessory use is 
the storage of used petroleum products, not the one-time installation of tanks. To the 
extent the Court rejects the view that such storage is an integrated and inseparable part of 
Golden Eagle's primary noiiconfonning use (and thus fully pemiissible as such), it cannot 
be denied that the storage of used oil is reasonably related to, incidental to, and 
subordinate to the primary activity of recycling oil. Accordingly, in the alternative 
Golden Eagle is entitled to store used petroleum products in the Certified Tanks as an 
accessory use. 
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY THE 
RATIONALE THAT ANY OTHER HOLDING WOULD RESULT IN A 
PERPETUAL NONCONFORMING USE. 
Section 12-22-101 of the Ordinance states: 
The puipose of this section is to control and gradually eliminate 
those uses of land or buildings, which, although legal at the time of their 
establishment, do not now conform to the use, height, location, and similar 
regulations of the district within which they are situated. 
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The district court repeatedly relied on this section as a key support for its tenuous ruling. 
The court essentially reasoned backwards from this section to conclude that all of the 
foregoing arguments - about the need to comply with State environmental regulations, 
about the new tanks not constituting an enlargement of the nonconforming use, and about 
the tanks being at least a valid accessory use - must be rejected or else nonconforming 
uses might continue perpetually, thus subverting the stated puipose of the Ordinance. 
This argument fails for at least three reasons. 
First, as a factual matter, allowing a particular landowner to comply with State 
environmental regulations is hardly subversive of the broader City goal of gradually 
eliminating nonconforming uses. Situations such as this are relatively rare. Allowing 
Golden Eagle, or others similarly situated, to comply with State regulations without being 
stripped of its nonconforming use would not hinder the City's goal in any meaningful 
way. 
Second, City zoning goals cannot subvert State environmental laws or policies. As 
noted, to the extent there is a conflict between municipal goals and a State law, the State 
law wins. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d at 1121. Even assuming that installation of the Certified 
Tanks would undermine City policy, that outcome is nevertheless required to avoid 
subverting vital State environmental regulations. 
But third and perhaps most importantly, merely stating that the broad puipose of 
the City's Ordinance is to gradually eliminate nonconforming uses does not necessarily 
mean that the specific terms of the Ordinance actually does that. The devil is in the 
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details, as they say. Here, contrary to the district court's reasoning, the actual provisions 
of the Ordinance allows for a nonconfomiing use to continue in perpetuity. The 
Ordinance does not prohibit a nonconfomiing used oil reclamation facility, for instance, 
from purchasing new parts for its operation and thus continuing in business for the 
foreseeable future. One can imagine any number of potential nonconfomiing uses (e.g., 
farming) which could easily continue forever under the precise terms of the City 
Ordinance. 
Broad statements of puipose aside, the simple fact is that the City has not chosen 
to eliminate nonconfomiing uses according to the statutory regime established by the 
State Legislature. The City could have elected to eliminate all nonconforming uses 
through a reasonable amortization period as provided by State statute, but for its own 
reasons it chose not to do so. Instead, the City enacted a regime that allows 
nonconfomiing uses to continue to exist - even in peipetuity - but contains such uses 
within reasonable bounds. As explained above, installation of the Certified Tanks does 
not violate a fair reading of the actual restrictions in the Ordinance. The district court 
erred by using a broad policy statement to reach a result which the specific terms of the 
Ordinance itself do not require. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Golden Eagle respectfully requests that the decision of 
the district court be reversed and that summary judgment be entered in favor of Golden 
Eagle. 
Dated this g/- day of March, 2001. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
.Simonsen 
)ushku 
Bryan H. Booth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Determinative Legal Provisions 
Utah Code 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-103(l)(k) to (I) 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(k) "Nonconforming structure" means a structure that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; and 
(ii) because of subsequent zoning changes does not conform with 
the zoning regulations's setback, height restrictions, or other 
regulations that govern the structure. 
(1) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning 
regulation governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform 
with the zoning regulations that now govern the land. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408(1) to (2)(b) 
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or structure 
may be continued. 
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building, 
provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or made 
for the purpose of the extension. 
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy device 
to a building is not a structural alteration. 
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment 
for: 
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, 
expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the tem& 
and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance; 
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by 
providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during 
which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his 
investment in the nonconforming use, if any; and 
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Woods Cross City Ordinance 
Chapter 12-22 Prior Non-Conforming Uses 
12-22-101 Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of this Section is to control and gradually eliminate those uses of 
land or buildings, which, although legal at the time of their establishment, do not now 
conform to the use, height, location, and similar regulations of the district within which 
they are situated. 
12-22-102 Continuing Existing Uses 
Except as hereinafter specified, any use, building, or structure, lawfully existing at 
the time of the enactment or subsequent amendment of this Ordinance, may be continued, 
even though such use, building, or structure does not conform with the provisions of this 
Ordinance for the district in which it is located. Except as otherwise provided by law, 
nothing in this Chapter shall prevent or discourage the strengthening or restoring to a 
safe condition or any part of any building or structure declared unsafe by proper 
authority. 
12-22-103 Construction Approved Prior to Enactment 
A building, structure, or part thereof which does not conform to the regulations 
for the district in which it is situated, but for which a building permit was issued and 
construction started prior to the enactment of this Title ( or a substantially similar 
preceding provision), may be completed in accordance with such plans, provided work is 
prosecuted continuously and without delay. Such building shall be deemed to be 
nonconforming and shall be subject to the regulations set forth herein. 
12-22-104 Nonconforming Uses, Substitution, Extension 
A nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or changed unless the use is 
changed to a use permitted in the district in which it is located, and a nonconforming 
building shall not be reconstructed or structurally altered unless such alteration results in 
removing those conditions of the building which render it nonconforming, except as 
follows: 
(a) More Desirable. When authorized by the City Council in consideration of the 
prior recommendation of the Planning Commission, and in accordance with this Title, a 
nonconforming use which is determined to be of a more desirable nature may be 
substituted for another nonconforming use. 
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(b) Repairs. Repairs and structural alterations necessary for building safety may 
be made to a nonconforming building provided that the floor area of such building is not 
increased. 
(c) Within Building. A nonconforming use may be extended to include the entire 
floor area of the existing building in which it is conducted at the time the use became 
nonconforming. 
(d) Force Majeure. A nonconforming building or structure which is damaged or 
partially destroyed by fire, flood, wind, earthquake, or other calamity or act of nature or 
the public enemy, may be restored. The occupancy or use of such building structure or 
part thereof which existed at the time of such partial destruction may be continued or 
resumed provided that such restoration is started within a period of 1 year and is 
diligently prosecuted to completion within a period of 2 years. In the event such damage 
or destruction exceeds 3 times the assessed value of such nonconforming building or 
structure, no repairs or reconstruction shall be made, except in the case of residences or 
accessory farm buildings, unless every portion of such building or structure is made to 
conform to all regulations for new buildings in the zone in which it is located, as 
determined by the Planning Director. 
12-22-105 Change of Use Not Allowed 
Whenever a nonconforming use has been changed to a conforming use, such a use 
shall not thereafter be changed or returned to a nonconforming use. 
12-22-106 Cessation of Use 
A use shall be deemed to have ceased when it has been discontinued either 
temporarily or permanently for a period of one year or more, whether or not with the 
intent to abandon said use, subject to the following provisions: 
(a) Cessation of Use of Building Designated or Designed for Nonconforming Use. 
Except for residential or accessory farm structure, a building or structure which was 
originally designed for a nonconforming use shall not be put to a nonconforming use 
again when such use has ceased for one year or more. 
(b) Cessation of use of Building Not Designed for Nonconforming Use. A 
building or structure which was not originally designed as a nonconforming use shall not 
be put to a nonconforming use again when such use has ceased for 6 months or more. 
(c) Cessation of use of Nonconforming Use of Land. A nonconforming use of 
land not involving any building or structure (except minor structures such as fences, 
Add -3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
signs, and buildings less than 400 square feet in area) shall not be resumed when such 
uses has ceased for 3 months or more. 
(d) Cessation of Keeping of Nonconforming Animals. The keeping of 
nonconforming animals shall not be resumed when such use has ceased for one year. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GOLDEN EAGLE OIL REFINERY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal 
INC., 
corporation and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DEFENDANT'S CROSS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 990700470 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment; and the Court having reviewed the Motion, and Plaintiffs Objection 
thereto; and the Court having reviewed Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Defendant's Objection thereto; and being fully advised in the premises, the court makes the .x 
following memorandum decision. 
BACKGROUND 
The matter before the Court concerns Plaintiffs oil reclamation business and real 
property upon which the business is located, at approximately 1474 West 1500 South, Woods 
Cross City, Davis County, Utah (hereafter, the "Property"). Prior to 1991, the Property was 
operated as a used oil reclamation facility. In 1991, Defendant changed zoning of the Property 
from heavy industrial classification (including such uses as oil recycling) to a light industrial 
classification ("M") which, according to Woods Cross City, does not allow petroleum-related 
activities. However, after the zoning change, the used oil reclamation facility continued to 
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operate on the Property as a nonconforming use. In 1993, Stan Hartmark and Merrill 
Maughan, the present owners of the Golden Eagle Oil Refinery, purchased the refinery and all 
its assets in order to clean up the Property and continue the used oil reclamation operations. 
Golden Eagle obtained a valid business permit from the City to operate its oil reclamation 
facility and has renewed its permit every year since. 
To comply with Utah Administrative Code R315-15-5.5(c), Plaintiff drained and 
removed seventeen, old storage tanks which were used to store a combined capacity of 
202,000 gallons of petroleum waste products, between May of 1998 and June of 1998. The 
old storage tanks ("Old Tanks") were then replaced with six newer, certified API 650 tanks 
("Certified Tanks") with a combined capacity of 116,000 gallons of petroleum products. 
These tanks were relocated to the center of the Property to make the Property more 
aesthetically pleasing to neighbors. On June 10, 1999, Golden Eagle was informed that it had 
to obtain site plan approval from the City for the replacement of the tanks. Golden Eagle 
submitted the Application and corresponding fee on July 15, 1999. At the August 10, 1999 
hearing, the Planning Commission unanimously agreed that the changes by Golden Eagle 
created a more desirable situation and Golden Eagle should be allowed to install the Certified 
Tanks. On October 6, 1999, the Woods Cross City Council rejected the Planning 
Commission's recommendation and refused to approve any permit relating to the replacement 
of the Old Tanks, finding that the Old Tanks had been abandoned and were not eligible for 
reuse as a non-conforming use on the site. Furthermore, any attempt to replace the abandoned 
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nonconforming use. On November 5, 1999, Golden Eagle filed an Appeal and Statement of 
Grounds with the City Council, and on November 16, 1999, the City Council informed 
Golden Eagle that its Appeal was denied. 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief on December 16, 
1999, and filed an Amended Complaint on January 13, 2000. Defendant's Answer to 
Plaintiffs amended Complaint and Counterclaim was filed on February 7, 2000. Plaintiff 
filed a Reply to Counterclaim on February 17, 2000. On April 27, 2000, Plaintiff filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum, claiming: 1) Golden Eagle's oil 
reclamation operations are a legal nonconforming use; 2) The use of the storage tanks never 
ceased; and 3) Replacement of the storage tanks with the certified new tanks does not violate 
Woods Cross city's nonconforming use ordinance. Defendant filed a Rule 56(f) Motion on 
May 8, 2000, and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 13, 2000. Plaintiff 
filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 29, 2000, 
claiming; 1) Golden Eagle's replacement of storage tanks is barred because the use of the 
tanks ceased for a one-year period, and 2) "Strengthening or restoration" to a safe condition, 
under Woods Cross City Ordinance § 12-22-102, does not contemplate complete replacement 
of facilities which have essentially been abandoned. On July 11, 2000, Defendant filed a 
Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and a Notice to Submit 
for Decision. On August 29, 2000, the Court heard the above-entitled matter, took the matter 
3 
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under advisement, and requested the parties supplement their arguments. Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Memorandum was filed on September 7, 2000, and Defendant's Supplemental 
Memorandum was filed on September 15, 2000. The Court looks to the Utah Code, the 
Woods Cross City Ordinances and applicable law in determination of the matter. 
ANALYSIS 
The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties 
to submit the matter on the pleadings where there is no genuine issue to present to the fact 
finder. In accordance with this purpose, specific facts are required to show whether there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). 
In reviewing the summary judgment, the court considers the record in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion, resolving all doubts in his favor. If after a review of the 
record, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists, we must reverse the summary 
judgment and remand for further proceedings on the issue. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank 
737 P.2d 229 (Utah 1987). The Court having again reviewed the respective memorandums 
following the August 29, 2000 hearing, considers both motions for summary judgment on the 
following issues: 1) Whether General Eagle operates as a legal nonconforming use; 2) 
Whether the use of the Old Tanks ceased at any time for a period of one year prior to their 
replacement; 3) Whether the nonconforming use ceased for a one year period when the Old 
Tanks were replaced; 4) Whether the replacement of the Old Tanks with the new Certified 
Tanks violates Woods Cross city's nonconforming use ordinance; and 5) Whether the 
4 
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installation of the Certified Tanks constitutes a legal, ancillary use. In determination of these 
issues, the court recognizes that Utah caselaw is limited concerning cases of nonconforming 
use, its abandonment and expansion and, therefore, looks to other jurisdictions as well for 
applicable law. 
First, the court considers whether Golden Eagle's oil reclamation operations are a legal 
nonconforming use. Utah Municipal Code § 10-9-103(1) defines a legal nonconforming use as 
follows: 
1) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation 
governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning 
regulations that now govern the land. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-103(1). Section 10-9-408 U.M.C. provides that "a nonconforming 
use or structure may be continued" except in certain narrow circumstances enumerated therein, 
and further authorizes municipalities to enact zoning ordinances relating to the expansion of 
nonconforming uses: 
(2) The [municipalities'] legislative body may provide in any zoning 
ordinance or amendment for: 
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, 
expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms and 
conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance.... 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-408(2). Woods Cross City has enacted the following ordinance 
relating to nonconforming uses: 
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12-22-102 Continuing Existing Uses 
Except as hereinafter specified, any use, building, or structure, lawfully existing 
at the time of the enactment or subsequent amendment of this Ordinance, may 
be continued, even though such use, building or structure does not conform 
with the provisions of this Ordinance for the district in which it is located. 
WOODS CROSS CITY ORDINANCES § 12-22-102. The Property was used for used oil 
reclamation prior to the 1991 zoning change, and has been used continually since that date for 
used oil reclamation operations. In its Answer to Golden Eagle's Amended Complaint 
(Answer to Am. Compl. At t 5.) and at the August 29, 2000 hearing, the City acknowledged 
that Golden Eagle's used oil reclamation facility has remained continuously operational as a 
legal nonconforming use, and has raised no challenge to Golden Eagle's general operation as a 
used oil facility. Therefore, the court finds that Golden Eagle's used oil reclamation 
operations qualify as a legal nonconforming use under the Utah Municipal Code and Woods 
Cross Ordinance § 12-22-102. 
Second, the court determines whether the use of the seventeen Old Tanks ceased for a 
period of one year between 1991 and 1998. Plaintiff argues that the City relied upon Woods 
Cross City Ordinance §12-22-106(a) in determining that the old tanks removed from the site 
had been abandoned and were therefore not eligible for reuse as a nonconforming use on the 
site. Plaintiff claims that the use of the Old Tanks never ceased for a one-year period and, 
therefore, their nonconforming use had not been abandoned. The Defendant, on the other 
hand, claims that Golden Eagle's replacement of the storage tanks is barred because the use of 
the tanks did in fact cease for at least one year prior to the installation of the Certified Tanks. 
6
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In determination of the matter, the Court looks to the City's ordinance relating to the cessation 
of a nonconforming use, which states as follows: 
12-22-106 Cessation of Use 
A use shall be deemed to have ceased when it has been discontinued either temporarily 
or permanently for a period of one year or more, whether or not with the intent to 
abandon said use, subject to the following provisions: 
(a) Cessation of Use of Building Designated or Designed for Nonconforming 
Use. Except for residential or accessory farm structure^], a building or structure 
which was originally designed for a nonconforming use shall not be put to a 
nonconforming use again when such use has ceased for one year or more. 
WOODS CROSS CITY ORDINANCE §12-22-106(a). The Court finds that the issue of whether the 
use of the tanks ever ceased for a period of one year centers around which definition of "in 
use" it chooses to accept. More precisely, should storage tanks by the mere fact that they 
contain hazardous material, be determined as being "in use." When zoning changes occurred 
in 1991, the Old Tanks were already on the Property, storing hazardous, petroleum materials. 
When the current owners purchased the facility in 1993, the Old Tanks continued to contain 
the same hazardous, petroleum materials. Golden Eagle did not add to or empty the Old 
Tanks, but continued to "use" them to store those same hazardous materials up until the time 
that each tank was emptied, dismantled, and hauled away. Plaintiff argues that due to the fact 
the Old Tanks contained petroleum materials, they were "in use," and that the nonconforming 
use did not cease prior to the replacement of the tanks or when the tanks were replaced. 
The Utah Administrative Code R315-15-5.5, provides in part: 
(f) Closure. 
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(1) Aboveground tanks. Owners and operators who store or process used oil in 
aboveground tanks shall comply with the following requirements: 
(i) At closure of a tank system, the owner or operator shall remove or 
decontaminate used oil residues in tanks, contaminated containment system 
components, contaminated soils, and structures and equipment contaminated with used 
oil, and manage them as hazardous waste, unless the materials are not hazardous waste 
under this chapter. 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R315-14-5.5(f). Plaintiff argues, that by the language of this rule, a tank 
system is not considered "closed" until all of the used oil residues are removed from the tank 
and all contaminated system components are properly disposed of. Furthermore, the rules 
relating to used oil also prohibits the disposal of "an item...that contains de minimis amounts 
of oil" unless "all oil has been removed from the item" and "[no free flowing oil remains in 
the item or substance." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R315-14-1.5. Therefore, Plaintiff claims that the 
Old Tanks were "in use" and subject to regulation until they were properly emptied and 
disposed of in accordance with these rules. 
Plaintiff also sites V-l Oil v. Dept of Environ Quality, 904 P.2d 214 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). In that case, the plaintiff claimed that an underground storage tank did not need to be 
registered with the Department of Environmental Quality because it was not "in use." In its 
decision, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Hazardous Waste Control Board's decision 
that "a tank is 'in use' if it contains a regulated substance or petroleum. The tank need not be 
used to dispense petroleum; it need only be used to store or contain petroleum in order to be 
'muse.'" Id,at217. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs definition of "in use" lacks merit and misinterprets the 
Court of Appeal's decision in V-l Oil which also states: 
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There is no usual and accepted meaning of the terms "in use" in the context of 
USTs. The record reveals that the federal regulations, Utah's administrative rules, the 
presiding officer's conclusions, the Board's conclusions, and V-l's interpretation all 
provide slightly different definitions of the terms. Furthermore, the terms are of such a 
general nature that the dictionary definitions are not helpful. We therefore construe the 
terms, and the Board did, in light of pertinent rules of statutory construction. 
In Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined several rules of statutory construction that are helpful here. 
First, "a statute should not be construed in a piecemeal fashion but as a comprehensive 
whole." Id. at 1045. Additionally, "'[i]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the 
meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in 
its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with 
its intent and purpose.'" Id. (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 
242,243 (Utah 1980)). "Finally, in dealing with an unclear statute, this court renders 
interpretations that will 'best promote the protection of the public.'" Id. (quoting 
Curtis v. Harmon Elec, 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978)). 
Id, at 217. Defendant argues that according to V-1 Oil Co., "a statute should not be construed 
in a piecemeal fashion but as a comprehensive whole." IcL. As such, the Woods Cross City 
Ordinances relating to cessation of a nonconforming use should be construed in light of the 
City's comprehensive regulations governing nonconforming uses of property. 
§12-22-101 of the Woods Cross City zoning ordinance reads: 
The purpose and objective of this Section is to control and gradually eliminate 
those uses or land or buildings, which, although legal at the time of their establishment, 
do not now conform to the use, height, location, and similar regulations of the district 
within which they are situated. 
Where the Court recognizes that V-1 Oil Co. identifies when an oil storage tank is "in use" for 
purposes of registration with the Department of Environmental Quality, Division of 
Environmental Response and Remediation (DERR), the court does not necessarily find it 
Add -13 
\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conclusive in determining when an oil storage tank is in fact being used. The interpretation of 
"in use" offered by Golden Eagle would allow nonconforming tanks to exist perpetually, 
solely because some form of petroleum product remains in them. This obviously is contrary to 
the stated purpose and objective of gradually eliminating nonconforming uses. 
Third, the Court examines whether the nonconforming use ceased for a one year period 
when the Old Tanks were replaced. According to Plaintiffs above argument, the Certified 
Tanks will not be "in use" until they contain oil petroleum. Where the parties agree that the 
Old Tanks were drained between May 1, 1998 and June 4, 1998, the parties dispute by what 
date the new tanks were installed. The court was further informed during oral argument that 
the City enjoined Golden Eagle from placing any oil within the tanks, but neither party 
identified what date said order took effect or whether a years passage of time occurred 
between June 4, 1998 and the date of the City's injunction. Although the Court finds disputed 
facts on this issue, it does not find those facts to be materially dispositive of either Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Fourth, the Court examines whether the replacement of the Old Tanks with the 
Certified Tanks violated Woods Cross city's nonconforming use ordinance. Woods Cross City 
Ordinance § 12-22-102 states in part: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, nothing in this Chapter shall prevent or discourage 
the strengthening or restoring to a safe condition o[f] any part of any building or 
structure declared unsafe by proper authority. 
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Therefore, if a structure has been declared unsafe by proper authority, the nonconforming use 
ordinance is not intended to "prevent or discourage" the restoration of that structure to a safe 
condition. 
Plaintiff claims that in 1998, the Division informed Golden Eagle that the seventeen 
Old Tanks, containing hazardous, petroleum material, were found to be unsafe because they 
were leaking and did not have proper secondary containment, and that it was required to bring 
the Old Tanks into compliance with the applicable safety regulations. However, because of 
stringent new environmental regulations, Golden Eagle determined that it was impossible to 
bring the Old Tanks into compliance by simply altering or reinforcing them. Therefore, 
Plaintiff chose to remove the leaking tanks, pour concrete containment basins in a different 
location, and then install more modern tanks. In doing so, the Defendant argues that it did not 
enlarge, extend or change its nonconforming use, because the Old Tanks had a combined 
storage capacity of 202,000 gallons, while the new Certified Tanks have a storage capacity of 
116,000 gallons. 
Woods Cross Ordinance § 12-22-104 provides the following with respect to the 
enlargement of a nonconforming use: 
A nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or changed unless the use is 
changed to a use permitted in the district in which it is located, and a nonconforming 
building shall not be reconstructed or structurally altered unless such alteration results 
in removing those conditions of the building which render it nonconforming, except as 
follows: 
**** 
(b) Repairs. Repairs and structural alterations necessary for building safety 
may be made to a nonconforming building provided that the floor area of such building 
is not increased. 
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(c) Within Building. A nonconforming use may be extended to include the 
entire floor area of the existing building in which it is conducted at the time the use 
became nonconforming.... 
(d) Force Majeure. A nonconforming building or structure which is damaged 
or partially destroyed by fire, flood, wind, earthquake, or other calamity or act of 
nature or the public enemy may be restored.... 
Plaintiff argues that because the Division required Golden Eagle to make its tanks compliant 
with applicable safety regulations, § 12-22-102 takes priority over § 12-22-104, allowing the 
Plaintiff to restore its tanks to a safe condition. 
Defendant argues that "strengthening or restoration" to a safe condition, under § 12-22-
102 of the Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance, does not contemplate complete replacement 
of nonconforming structures, and the installation of the six Certified Tanks therefore is 
actually an enlargement of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use. Plaintiffs interpretation would 
again promote the perpetual existence of nonconforming uses in violation of the general 
purposes and objectives established by the City's ordinances. Additionally, Plaintiffs 
complete removal of the old Storage Tanks and replacement with new tanks is not in the nature 
of a simple repair or structural alteration contemplated in subparagraph (b) of § 12-22-104. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff permanently discontinued its use of the seventeen Old 
Tanks, but not its nonconforming use of the Property. As previously discussed, the seventeen 
Old Tanks existed on the Property with a legal nonconforming use. From at least 1991 to 
1998, the purpose of the Old Tanks, with a storage capacity of 202,000 gallons, was not to 
contain used petroleum for reprocessing, but to contain hazardous waste. In that period of 
time, the parties agree that the tanks were used for no other purpose. When the tanks were 
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discovered to be leaking, the Plaintiff voluntarily chose to drain and dispose of the waste and 
physically remove the tanks from the Property. The Court finds that removal of the Old 
Tanks constitutes a permanent discontinuance under § 12-22-106 of the Woods Cross 
Ordinances. 
As previously cited, § 12-22-106(a) of the Woods Cross Ordinances establishes that a 
"structure which was originally designed for a nonconforming use shall not be put to a 
nonconforming use again when such use was ceased for one year or more." In this case, the 
original structures (the Old Tanks) have not been put back into use, and under § 12-22-106 of 
the Woods Cross Ordinances, the Court finds that the six Certified Tanks are not the "original 
structures." Therefore, they do not meet the requirements or purpose of the Woods Cross 
Ordinances. The Court finds that voluntary demolition of a structure constitutes a permanent 
discontinuance of that structure under § 12-22-106 of the Woods Cross Ordinances, and in 
essence, constitutes a permanent abandonment. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the installation of the six, new Certified Tanks, with a 
combined storage capacity of 116,000 gallons, at a different location on the Property, does not 
constitute a repair or a structural alteration under § 12-22-104 of the Woods Cross Ordinances, 
and does not amount to "strengthening or restoring to a safe condition o[f] any part of any 
building or structure declared unsafe by proper authority," under § 12-22-102 of the Woods 
Cross Ordinances. The facts of the case show that the Old Tanks were leaking due to natural 
deterioration accompanied by age. To replace the tanks would be an entirely new 
improvement and would extend the use beyond their normal lives, and promote the perpetual 
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existence of nonconforming uses in violation of the general purposes and objectives established 
by the City's ordinances. Dienelt v. County of Monterey, 113 Cal App 2d 128, 247 P2d 925 
(1952). Therefore, under Woods Cross City Ordinance § 12-22-106, Golden Eagle retains the 
right to store waste materials for a period of one year from the date the nonconforming use of 
the Property ceased, but does not retain the right to replace those structures that have been 
permanently discontinued. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the new Certified Tanks is not just to store hazardous 
waste as the Old Tanks had, but essentially to store used petroleum products for reprocessing. 
This is an expansion of the purpose of the Old Tanks. It is undisputed that the Old Tanks 
were not used from 1991 to 1998 to store used petroleum products for reprocessing. Their use 
was limited to storing hazardous waste. Therefore, the Certified Tanks are designed for a 
different use. The removal of the Old Tanks and installation of new Certified Tanks acts as a 
replacement and expansion of a nonconforming use, for which the nonconforming use 
provisions of the Woods Cross Ordinances were specifically designed to prevent. When the 
seventeen Old Tanks were removed, their structures' nonconforming use of storing hazardous 
waste essentially ceases (because the "original structure^]" were not replaced), and the 
nonconforming use of the whole Property would be restricted as to that use after one year. 
Lastly, the Court determines whether the installation and use of the Certified Tanks 
constitutes a legal accessory use. In its Supplemental Memorandum, Plaintiff raises the 
argument that the storing of used oil, whether it is ultimately recycled or not, is an integral 
part of its business and is therefore sufficient to preserve Golden Eagle's right to use the 
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Certified Tanks as an accessory use, in conjunction with its oil reclamation operations. 
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs argument completely ignores the fact that installation of the 
Certified Tanks constitutes an unlawful extension of the life of the nonconforming use and is 
therefore illegal. 
Plaintiff defines the doctrine of accessory uses as follows: 
Under the Doctrine of Accessory Uses, a landowner is permitted to maintain an 
accessory to incidental use in connection with a permitted use of land if the accessory 
use is truly incidental to the primary nonconforming use and does not change the basic 
nature of the use of the property. 
Atkins v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Union County, 281 S.E.2d 756, 760 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1981). Consistent with this statement, the City's ordinances contains the following definition 
of "accessory use": 
The term "accessory use" shall mean a use which is incidental to and subordinate to the 
prescribed permitted use within any respective zoning provisions. 
Woods Cross Ordinances § 12-2-103. Plaintiff claims that the use of the Certified Tanks is 
clearly a use which is incidental to, subordinate to, and reasonably related to Golden Eagle's 
primary nonconforming use of the property as a used oil reclamation business. Thus, because 
Plaintiffs use of the Certified Tanks is incidental to the primary nonconforming use and does 
not change the basic nature of the use of the property, it is permitted to maintain its accessory 
use of the tanks. 
As previously discussed, the Court finds the installation of the Certified Tanks to be an 
unlawful replacement and substantial expansion of Plaintiffs nonconforming use. The Court 
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agrees that "[A] lawful nonconforming use may be validly expanded by a reasonable accessory 
use which is not detrimental to the public health, welfare, or safety." Jackson v. Pottstown 
Zoning Board of Adjustment, 233 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 1967) However, the Court does not 
find the installation of the six Certified Tanks with a storage capacity of 116,000 gallons to be 
"reasonable," "incidental," or "subordinate" to the use of the Property. Instead, it 
substantially expands the use of the Property to store an additional 116,000 gallons of 
recyclable oil. A change in storage capacity is not permissible when the spirit of the zoning 
act was to restrict, rather than increase any nonconforming use. Home Fuel Oil Co. v. Glen 
Rock, 118 NJL 340, 192 A 516. Therefore, the Court does not find the Certified Tanks to be 
an accessory use. 
In conclusion, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has a valid nonconforming use as to the 
Property and business run thereon. The mere existence of the seventeen Old Tanks with the 
purpose of storing hazardous waste upon the Property from at least 1993 to 1998 does not 
necessarily make them "in use." Regardless of whether the Old Tanks ever ceased to be "in 
use" for a period of one year, the Court finds that the voluntary demolition of a building or 
structure constitutes a permanent discontinuance under § 12-22-106 of the Woods Cross 
Ordinances. Furthermore, the purpose of the new Certified Tanks is not simply to store 
hazardous materials as the Old Tanks had, but to contain used petroleum for reprocessing. 
Therefore, because the purpose of the Certified Tanks is different than that of the Old Tanks 
and substantially increases Golden Eagle's storage capacity by 116,000 gallons, the installation 
of the six Certified Tanks acts as an enlargement of Plaintiffs nonconforming use of Property. 
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Because the increase of storage capacity is neither "reasonable," "incidental" nor 
"subordinate" to the Golden Eagle's principal use, but instead substantially increases it, the 
Court does not find the Certified Tanks to constitute an accessory use. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully denies Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses 
Plaintiffs claims with prejudice. Plaintiff is enjoined from using the six Certified Tanks upon 
its Property. 
Dated October H , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
-3*JV 
JON M. MEMMOTT 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE1 
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